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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following: a small city of about 30,000 must decide whether
to allow construction of a controversial industrial facility. The plant will
generate sorely needed jobs and tax revenue, but it might also pose serious
environmental and public-health risks. Under normal circumstances, the city
council would require the developer to undertake a set of technical studies
that city departments would review before a permit could be granted. Then,
the city government (including several elected and/or appointed boards)
might hold a hearing, and ultimately vote on whether to approve the project.
Along the way, there might be a lot of letters to the editor of the local
newspaper and even a referendum.
Consider this alternative: city council hires a professional neutral-a
mediator-to meet privately and confidentially with all relevant stakeholders,
both in and outside the city, to learn their concerns about the proposed
project. Along with the developer of the proposed facility and appointees
from a range of city and regional departments, carefully selected stakeholder
representatives are invited to engage in joint fact-finding to see if they can
resolve their differences. After a year of highly transparent and mediator-
facilitated problem-solving, the forty (or so) stakeholder representatives sign
an agreement. It spells out the circumstances under which they can all
support a revised version of the project. It also commits them to making a
series of voluntary payments and other contingent commitments from the
developer and the city-maybe even the state and federal government, too-
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that go well beyond what the city has a statutory right to require. They all
present the agreement to the city council, which ratifies it. Its details are
added as conditions to the various formal permits granted to the developer.
The agreement creates a joint monitoring committee whose staff is paid by
the project developer. The project goes forward with little or no political
opposition.
Which of these two scenarios describes a process that is more
democratic?' Which is more likely to produce a socially beneficial outcome?
If it is possible to avoid the rancor and cost of the litigation and political
1This is not a rhetorical question. There is no clear understanding of what
democracy requires in the United States with regard to this kind of decisionmaking
beyond enforcement of the Constitution. At various times in our history, and through
regulatory and administrative means, we have added additional mandates regarding
public participation in governmental (particularly regulatory) decisionmaking. But it is
not clear that these have yet reached the point of requiring the kind of consensus building
described above. For more on this debate, see IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 35-49 (2003); Amy Guttman & Dennis Thompson, Deliberative Democracy
Beyond Process, in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 31-53 (James S. Fishkin &
Peter Laslett eds., 2003); Robert E. Goodin, Democratic Deliberation Within, in
DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 54-79; Philip Petit, Deliberative
Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma, and Republican Theory, in DEBATING
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 138-62; JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY
AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 81-104 (1991); see
generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 39-138 (1980)
(describing a town meeting as a form of a government system's use of democracy);
JOSHUA COHEN & JOEL ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY 146-83 (1983) (describing a democratic
conception of politics and a political philosophy for a social order that is alternative to
capitalist democracy). For more on the distinction between deliberative democracy and
consensus building, see LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND & JEFFREY L. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING
ROBERT'S RULES: THE NEW WAY To RUN YOUR MEETING, BUILD CONSENSUS, AND GET
RESULTS 18-40 (2006) [hereinafter SUSSKIND & CRUIKsHANK, BREAKING ROBERT'S
RULES]; LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 136-85 (1987) [hereinafter
SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE]; see generally Lawrence Susskind,
An Alternative to Robert's Rules of Order for Groups, Organizations, and Ad Hoc
Assemblies That Want to Operate by Consensus, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE To REACHING AGREEMENT 3-57 (Lawrence
Susskind, Sarah McKearnan & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds., 1999) (describing
consensus building) [hereinafter Susskind, Alternative to Robert's Rules]. The
comparison between democracy and consensus building was the topic of an MIT
Symposium at which the authors listed above participated. See Stellar Course
Management System, Workshop on Deliberative Democracy and Dispute Resolution
http://stellar.mit.edu/S/project/deliberativedemocracy/ (last visited June 27, 2009); see
also Lawrence Susskind, Can Public Policy Dispute Resolution Meet the Challenges Set
by Deliberative Democracy?, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2006, at 5, 5-6 [hereinafter
Susskind, Public Policy Dispute Resolution].
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confrontation that typifies the first scenario, wouldn't the second be
preferable? If the second scenario yields an informed consensus that all the
relevant stakeholders and agencies support, would it, by definition, be a
better outcome?
There are three problems with the way our traditional approach to
democratic decisionmaking allocates scarce resources, establishes policy
priorities, and sets health, safety, and related standards in the public arena.
The way we make public policy and "do" democracy in America can be
improved in a rather straightforward manner by addressing these three
problems in a new and different way. The purpose of this article is to
describe these three problems and then explain why and how a "consensus
building approach" to public decisionmaking can produce better-that is,
fairer, stabler, wiser, and more efficient-results. 2
The three problems are:
1. The Majority Rule Problem: we allow the majority to rule, but if we
tried, we could come close to meeting the needs of all the stakeholders
affected by or involved in key public policy choices.
2. The Representation Problem: we rely on general-purpose elected
officials rather than ad hoc representatives selected specifically to speak on
behalf of the scope and intensity of concerns of key stakeholder groups in
public policy decisions.
3. The Adversarial Problem: we accept an adversarial approach to
decisionmaking when facilitated joint problem-solving would produce results
that are fairer in the eyes of the parties, more efficient from the standpoint of
an independent analyst, more stable as defined by the terms of the agreement,
and wiser, in retrospect, according to the parties and independent analysts.
II. THE PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC DECISIONMAKING
A. The Majority Rule Problem
Our democracy's legislative bodies rely on majority voting. Most people
think that the best a democracy can do is to identify choices and make
decisions that satisfy 51% of those who vote on the matter. The other side of
this assumption is that the other 49% should accept defeat.
2 For a more complete discussion of these four criteria, see SUSSKIND &
CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE, supra note 1, at 80-81. The importance of these
four criteria and their relationship to democratic decisionmaking were raised initially in
Lawrence E. Susskind, Keynote Address: Consensus-Building, Public Dispute
Resolution, and Social Justice, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 185, 196 (2008).
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We rarely even try to make policies or decisions aimed at meeting the
interests of all (or almost all) the stakeholders involved in key public policy
decisions. Why not? After all, it is unlikely that we will come close to
meeting the interests of all the stakeholders by accident. There is little or no
chance of it if we do not make a good-faith effort to try. Near-unanimity will
not emerge as a byproduct of majoritarian decisionmaking. Why not at least
try to achieve consensus? Many people assume that consensus will take too
long to work out, cost too much, and risk the prospect of a stalemate. But
why not specify a limited timeframe and budget to try to achieve near-
unanimity, and then settle for something as close to that as possible once it is
clear we can not do any better?3
We tend to think that majority rule is the best method a democracy can
implement. However, the fact is that large and diverse groups of stakeholders
have confronted divisive and complex decisions and have achieved near
unanimity.4 In almost all instances, they committed to a process that offered
3 See Susskind, Public Policy Dispute Resolution, supra note 1, at 6-7 (defining
"consensus" as the result of an effort to seek unanimity, but in which participants settle
for overwhelming agreement, as long as every effort has been made to accommodate
holdouts who, in turn, have been given a chance to propose modifications to the
prevailing agreement that would make it better for them and no worse for anyone else).
4 For analyses of large sets of successful collaborative efforts, see LAWRENCE
SUSSKIND ET AL., MEDIATING LAND USE DISPUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL OFFICIALS
(1999); THOMAS C. BEIERLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS (2002) (providing research on developing
an understanding of the social value of public participation and understanding what
makes some processes successful and others not); Howard Kunreuther et al., Siting
Noxious Facilities: A Test of the Facility Siting Credo, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 301, 301-18
(1993) (describing the use of collaborative efforts in the siting of noxious facilities);
Center for Public Policy Dispute Resolution, Case Studies of Resolving Public Disputes,
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/cppdr/services/resolv_pub disp.php (last
visited June 27, 2009); cf Thomas C. Beierle & Jerry Cayford, Evaluating Dispute
Resolution as an Approach to Public Participation, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, Aug.
2001, at 11-15, available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-01-40.pdf. Beierle
and Cayford look at several hundred cases studies of dispute resolution, but their sample
includes many instances where no effort was made to ensure that (1) stakeholder group
representatives were actually chosen by the relevant constituencies (and not appointed by
public agencies); (2) representatives were given a clear mandate by their constituents
after being involved in some kind of joint fact finding process; and (3) representatives
were responsible for bringing back the penultimate version of any agreement to their
constituents for review before anything was finalized. In recent years, these have come to
be considered best practices (along with the involvement of a trained mediator selected
with the concurrence of all the parties). So, it is not surprising they found that many
dispute resolution efforts did not lead to enthusiastic implementation of agreements by
large numbers of stakeholders who were not at the table themselves. In contrast, perhaps
the most compelling analysis of case studies of consensus building efforts is Judy Innes
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all the relevant stakeholders the chance to help generate a proposal that was
better for everyone involved than the most likely alternative. 5 These groups
agreed at the outset that consensus would be achieved only if almost every
stakeholder representative got a better outcome than they could have
expected otherwise.6
First, consider the logic of it. With a tightly drawn timetable and detailed
ground rules that they helped to establish, a wide range of stakeholders
volunteered to sit at a table. They did so because they were offered a chance
to participate in shaping public policy and because there was a proviso:
There would be no agreement unless almost all participants signed a written
set of commitments that offered, in their view, a better result for them than
they could otherwise reasonably expect.
How can a voluntary problem-solving approach to policymaking come
up with something better for all parties than a majority-rule vote by duly
elected and appointed officials? The answer is to be found in the system of
representation, management of the conversation by a professional neutral, a
commitment to joint fact-finding, and the techniques of value creation or
integrative bargaining.7
B. The Representation Problem
General-purpose elected officials can rarely if ever reflect the intensity of
concern of all the various factions within the electorate. 8 Elected officials
usually see themselves as accountable to the people who voted for them and
whose votes they will need to secure re-election. 9
Even if that were not true, all-purpose elected officials cannot possibly
know enough about every issue that comes before them to shape the most
& David Booher, Beyond Collaboration: Planning and Public Policy for the 21 st Century
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
5 See generally SUSSKIND ET AL., supra note 4.
6 See id.
7 For a more complete discussion of these criteria, see MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATIONS
(Lawrence Susskind & Larry Crump eds., 2008). See also SUSSKiND AND CRUIKSHANK,
BREAKING THE IMPASSE, supra note 1, at 33-34 (explaining value creation in multiparty
negotiation).
8 SOL ERDMAN & LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, THE CURE FOR OUR BROKEN POLITICAL
PROCESS: How WE CAN GET OUR POLITICIANS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES TEARING OUR
COUNTRY APART 33-46 (2008).
9 See generally G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF
DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS 159-232 (2000) (describing
how citizen preferences, the majoritarian policy vision, and the proportional influence
vision may affect political parties and politicians).
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effective way of addressing the issues while balancing constituents'
conflicting interests. It is unrealistic to expect even the appointed staffs they
select to be both experts on every issue and also willing, able, and allowed to
bring an independent non-partisan perspective to the choices before them.
We gave up any claim to this possibility when we politicized the selection of
almost every layer of expertise in government. To the winner go the spoils.' 0
It makes more sense for each stakeholder group to choose an ad hoc
representative to speak for them on each key public-policy choice that
concerns them. In addition, we need to be able to redefine the relevant
categories of stakeholders for each public policy decision if we are going to
ensure accountable and effective representation.
How would this work? To flesh out the hypothetical example introduced
above, imagine that a city council charged with making a decision selects a
professional neutral. This person initiates a procedure called a conflict
assessment.11 The neutral meets with each potential stakeholder group to
learn about its interests, priorities, and concerns. With this information in
hand, the neutral "maps the conflict."'1 2 The neutral identifies the public
policy questions involved and the stakeholder groups that ought to be
included in an attempt to address them.13 He or she suggests ground rules, a
timetable, a budget, and a joint fact-finding agenda. 14 This assessment,
structured as a draft proposal, is then circulated for comment among
everyone interviewed. Based on their reactions, the neutral can offer the
elected body a clear statement regarding whether it is desirable to move
ahead with a consensus-building process, and if so, who should be involved
and how it should be structured.15
If the neutral moves forward with this process, ad hoc representation is
guaranteed. Clusters of stakeholders in relevant categories can caucus to
select their own spokespeople. Proxies can speak for hard-to-represent
10 For a recent example of this problem, see DAVID IGLESIAS, IN JUSTICE: INSIDE THE
SCANDAL THAT ROCKED THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2008) (describing the Bush
administration's politically partisan management of the Justice Department).
11 See Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Conducting A Conflict
Assessment, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 99-135; Todd
Schenk, Assessing the State of Conflict Assessment (Apr. 2008),
http://cbuilding.org/publication/article/2008/assessing-state-conflict-assessment (last
visited June 27, 2009).
12 See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT'S RULES, supra note 1, at 41-
60; see also Susskind & Thomas-Larmer, supra note 11, at 99-135.
13 Susskind & Thomas-Larmer, supra note 11, at 99-135.
14 Id.
15 See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT'S RULES, supra note 1, at 23-
24,46-53,170.
[Vol. 24:3 20091
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
constituencies. The neutral can assist any group that needs help preparing to
participate. 16 The neutral can also manage a process of documenting the
dialogue in a way that is accessible to all the constituents and stakeholder
groups.
It is up to the initial elected body to make a decision whether to go
forward with the collaborative process recommended by the neutral.17 If they
do, the presumption is that the elected body would review and endorse a
consensus agreement produced within the constraints approved at the outset.
Near-unanimous agreements should then be submitted to elected officials for
their approval. And why wouldn't they approve? All the constituents to
whom they are accountable have participated voluntarily in a process of
generating a negotiated agreement. Even their own personnel participated.
Each stakeholder representative must take the final draft of the
agreement back to his or her constituents for review before any final
agreement is signed into policy.18
C. The Adversarial Format Problem
In most public decisionmaking contexts, the presumption is that the only
way to move forward in the face of conflicting interests, values in dispute, or
variations in policy priorities is to pick a winner and loser, or winning and
losing coalitions. 19 Facing a win-lose situation, most groups invest as much
time in trying to discredit those who oppose them as they do in trying to
demonstrate how and why their favorite proposal is the best.20 The
16 For more on the roles that a professional neutral can play, see SussKIND &
CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE, supra note 1, at, 140-50.
17 I am not proposing to substitute ad-hocracy for representative democracy. See
SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT'S RULES, supra note 1, at 41-60. The aim
of the dialogue I am describing is to produce an informed proposal that must then be
acted upon by the body with the formal authority to do so. Id.
18 See id. at 133-53, 185-87 (describing how to draft strong, nearly self-enforcing
agreements to present to constituents by stakeholders, then how to hold the parties to
their commitments).
19 See James K. Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues
and Parties, 37 INT'L. ORG. 281, 284-85 (1983) (observing this presumption).
20 Arthur Schopenhauer sarcastically "recommends" this strategy in a treatise that
also suggests it is common because it requires little rhetorical skill. See Arthur
Schopenhauer, Stratagems, in THE ART OF CONTROVERSY (T. Bailey Saunders trans.,
2009) (1896), available at
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/s/schopenhauer/arthur/controversy/. A less glib explanation
links this tactic to a dynamic called "reactive devaluation," which is the tendency to
devalue a proposal because its source is perceived to be an opponent. See Lee Ross,
Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
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adversarial format presumes that any gains to one side necessarily take the
form of losses to others. Once that assumption is in place, there is no reason
to take seriously the information and the arguments put forward by other
stakeholders. 21 The adversarial format drives out joint problem-solving. It
also inhibits value creation, the invention of options, trades, or packages that
dovetail or trade across interests to produce good outcomes for all sides.22
Given the mixed motives of parties in complex negotiations-they have a
cooperative interest in creating as much value as possible, while pursuing
their competitive interest in claiming as large a share as possible-it is often
necessary to have a nonpartisan individual manage deliberative
interactions. 23
Once a group adopts near unanimity as its decision rule, factions within
it begin to put a premium on meeting the interests of others. Consensus
building encourages value creation. Relative to the factions' BATNAs, all-
gain becomes an achievable alternative to win-lose or adversarial
negotiation.24 Until we require public policymakers to embrace consensus as
a decision rule, then whenever public policy is made, the losers will have no
hope of achieving more than their minimal procedural rights. To achieve a
higher level of social benefit in public policymaking, we need to require the
imposition of near unanimity as the decision rule and provide the necessary
management support structure.
RESOLUTION 26-42 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995). It is perhaps also related to, and in
some ways dependent upon, what social psychologists call "the fundamental attribution
error," which is the tendency to overestimate the importance of personal causes, and
underestimate that of situational ones, in interpreting other people's behavior. See Lee
Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution
Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173, 184-87 (Len
Berkowitz ed., 1977). Lastly, in formal logic this discouraged tactic is widely known as
an ad hominem argument. IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 97-
100 (8th ed. 1990).
21 MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 16-22,
74-76, 87-88, 172-73 (1992); see generally HOWARD RAIFFA ET AL., NEGOTIATION
ANALYSIS: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING 279-83 (2002)
(explaining the zero sum bias as an example).
22 For more on value creation, see RAFFA ET AL., supra note 21, at 191-306
(describing two-party integrative negotiations). For more on how a neutral can facilitate
value creation, see SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT'S RULES, supra note 1,
at 83-113.
23 See, e.g., DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, 3D NEGOTIATION: POWERFUL
TOOLS TO CHANGE THE GAME IN YOUR MOST IMPORTANT DEALS 108-09 (2006).
2 4 ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATrON, GETTING To YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 104-11 (2d ed. 1992).
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None of what I have said is meant to suggest that we should substitute
ad-hocracy for representative democracy. Rather, I am proposing that prior to
decisionmaking, we have the option of supplementing the work of elected
and appointed officials by engaging all relevant stakeholders in consensus-
building.
If it is actually this easy to extend and deepen our commitment to
democratic ideals-and if it has already been put to work with great
success-what arguments or motives are strong enough to inhibit
institutional shifts in its direction?
III. THE OBSTACLES TO USING CONSENSUS BUILDING FOR PUBLIC
DECISIONMAKING 25
Elected and appointed officials are generally unfamiliar with the
consensus-building approach (CBA). Most know that certain minimal public
participation requirements must be met: open meetings, hearings, impact
assessment reports, and circulation of draft statements. But they are generally
unfamiliar with the idea of tapping a professional mediator to undertake a
conflict assessment that gets all the relevant parties to the table in order to
address an agenda of issues the leaders helped frame. And they are
unfamiliar with the dynamics of a consensus-building process aimed at
generating near unanimity on a proposal for their consideration.
Elected and appointed officials might think that using a CBA will
undermine their authority or their political power.26 Often, this is because
someone has suggested that they "turn over" decisionmaking responsibility
to an advisory group of some kind. However, that is not what the CBA
involves.27 Confusion abounds nevertheless. Powerful stakeholders in any
given decisionmaking situation expect to "win" by pursuing one of the
traditional approaches to public decisionmaking and resist any suggestion
that consensus building is necessary or desirable. And inversely, less-
powerful groups believe that only direct confrontation or legal action will
give them any chance of "winning. '28 Of course, those expecting litigation to
25 See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT'S RULES, supra note 1, at 154-
66, 191-95.
26 See id. at 187-88.
27 See id. at 167-87.
28 See generally GREGG P. MACEY & LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, USING DISPUTE
RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS: CASE
STUDIES (Consensus Building Institute, U.S. E.P.A., Office of Environmental Justice,
2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/publications/ej/cbi-case-
study-report.pdf (showing that litigating environmental justice cases has produced few, if
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"level the playing field" are often disappointed, as others with financial
resources use the courts to gain procedural victories, cause needless delays
through unnecessarily lengthy discovery and motion practices, 29 or to spend
their opponents into submission.
Some parties mistakenly assume that deadlines or financial constraints
preclude the use of a CBA. Many people assume that a consensus-building
approach is not compatible with a strict deadline. But the costs of litigation
and the delays caused by extended political battles are almost always greater
than the cost of a consensus-building approach. 30
any, victories for environmental justice groups, whereas a mediated approach has
produced substantial gains for the least powerful parties).
29 It has been argued that there are monetary incentives to delay for as long as
possible. See John B. Henry, Fortune 500: The Total Cost of Litigation Estimated at One-
Third Profits, THE METROPOLITAN CORP. CouNs., Feb. 1, 2008, at 28, available at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&EntryNo=7862.
30 For a more extended argument about cost comparisons, see SussKIND &
CRUJKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT'S RULES, supra note 1, at 157-58. For empirical and
testimonial support, see STATE OF OREGON DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COLLABORATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PILOT PROJECT 5 (2001), available at
http://www.doj.state.or.us/adr/pdf/gen74031.pdf. A report submitted January 30, 2001 to
Gene Derfler, Senate President, Mark Simmons, House Speaker, and members of the
legislature found that mediation was the least expensive of seven dispute resolution
options used in over 500 civil cases involving the State of Oregon and closed between
1998-2000. The average monthly process cost of mediation was $9,537, followed by
dispositive motion ($9,558), settlement negotiations ($10,344), arbitration ($14,290),
trial-settlement ($19,876), judicial settlement ($21,865), and trial-verdict ($60,557). Id. at
6; see also U.S. INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, ECR COST-
EFFECTIVENESS: EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD (2003), available at
http://www.ecr.gov/pdUecr costeffect.pdf; see generally Rosemary O'Leary & Maja
Husar, What Environmental and Natural Resource Attorneys Really Think about
Alternative Dispute Resolution: A National Survey, A.B.A. SEC. ENvTL, ENERGY, &
RESOURCES NEWSL., Vol. 4, Feb. 2003, at 2, available at
http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/adr/newsletter/feb03/attomeys.shtml. The
respondents estimated average cost-savings (to the client) of choosing ADR over
litigation to be $167,589.80 per case, and that ADR shortened case duration by 20.3
months on average. See FLA. CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONSORTIUM, STATE AGENCY
ADMIN. DIsP. RESOL. PILOT PROJECT REPORT, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR JULY 2000,
available at http://consensus.fsu.edu/ADRProjectlindex.html; see also Partnering
Program Saves ADOT Millions, POL'Y CONSENSUS INITIATIVE NEWSL., June 2002, at 6-
7, available at
www.policyconsensus.org/publications/news/docs/PCINewsletterJune_02.pdf. It
reported that the Arizona Department of Transportation saved $35 Million in the
execution of 1,140 construction contracts since 1991 through the use of collaboration and
dispute resolution process. In Florida, the Department of Business and Professional
Regulation's mediation program has reduced the average case length from 136 days to 47
days and the average cost from $1,225 to $211, netting a savings of over $400,000. See
404
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IV. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO CONSENSUS BUILDING
I suggest a few strategies for promoting the more widespread use of
consensus building as an approach to public decisionmaking.
The easiest and most effective is to incorporate mandates in statutes and
regulations spelling out how administrative and policymaking processes are
supposed to work.31 Elected and appointed officials can advocate for CBA
whether or not law requires it. There are a number of reasons they might
want to do this. First, before they have to make a key decision, almost every
elected official would like to know what version of that decision would be
likely to have unanimous support. The CBA can produce that information. 32
Second, almost every elected and appointed official would like to stand
for "more democracy," and a consensus building approach is inherently more
democratic. Key stakeholders could even go so far as to insist that anything
less than a consensus-building approach is undemocratic. While there are not
many groups that have made that argument, the burgeoning public-
engagement movement (sometimes called the deliberative democracy or
"new governance" movement) makes what I consider an analogous
argument. 33
Policy Consensus Initiative, Governing Tools for the 21st Century: How State Leaders
Are Using Collaborative Problem Solving and Dispute Resolution 5 (2002), available at
http://www.policyconsensus.org/publications/reports/docs/GovemingTools.pdf. Note that
some of these involved just mediation, which is a less powerful version of the consensus-
building approach that might, however, take less time due to CBA's "go slow to go fast"
strategy.
31 In 1996, Congress permanently enacted the Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584 (1996), which requires all executive agencies to promote the
use of ADR. See Lawrence E. Susskind et al., When ADR Becomes the Law: A Review of
Federal Practice, 9 NEGOT. J. 59, 59-75 (1993). There are other federal, state and local
laws that have been adopted in recent years that either permit or encourage CBA. See
Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute, The State of the States in Environmental Dispute
Resolution (1999), http://www.spea.indiana.edu/icri/sos/sosmain.htm. (last visited June
27, 2009) (displaying a (less than current) list of these by state). For more on how
Congress is and could be equipped to handle these kinds of disputes and dispute
resolution processes, see Peter S. Adler et al., Science and Technology Policy in
Congress: An Assessment of How Congress Seeks, Processes, and Legislates Complex
Science and Technology Issues, April 2008, available at
http://cbuilding.org/sites/default/files/Final-report6092_4_2008_0.pdf. For a review of
American states' laws and regulations in the land use and public disputes area, see
Matthew McKinney & Patrick Field, Evaluating Community-Based Collaboration on
Federal Lands and Resources, 21 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 419, 419-29 (2008).
32 See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT'S RULES, supra note 1, at 167-
87.
33 See ARCHON FUNG & ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY:
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Finally, increasing the supply of trained mediators skilled in public
dispute resolution would make it easier to apply CBA.34
V. CONCLUSION
A consensus building approach to public decisionmaking has both
theoretical appeal as the next step in the development of our democratic
system and practical appeal as a more effective way of dealing with
controversial decisions in the public arena.
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 3-45 (2003);
see generally MATT LEIGHNINGER, THE NEXT FORM OF DEMOCRACY: How EXPERT RULE
IS GIVING WAY TO SHARED GOVERNANCE... 149-223 (2006). It is encouraging that the
Obama administration appears committed to the kind of collaboration and transparency
that can best be achieved through the consensus building process. See Memorandum For
The Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Transparency and Open
Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 15 (Jan. 26,2009).
34 For more on balancing the supply and demand of public dispute mediators, see
Lawrence Susskind & Sarah McKearnan, The Evolution of Public Policy Resolution, 16
J. ARCHITECTURE & PLAN. RES. 96, 109-10 (1999). Those interested in training to become
public dispute mediators should see The Public Disputes Program, The Inter-University
Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, http://web.mit.edu/publicdisputes/ (last
visited June 27, 2009).
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